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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

1

Plaintiff/Appellee, :
v.

:

DAVID BRYANT WICKS,

:

Case No.

920307-CA

Priority No.

2

Defendant/Appellant.:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a sentence following a
conviction for forgery, a third degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1990), in the Fifth Judicial District
Court in and for Iron County, the Honorable Robert T.
Braithwaite, presiding.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear this

appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1992).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The issues presented in this appeal are:
1.

Did defendant fail to preserve for appeal his claim

concerning insufficient time to challenge the presentence report,
and if not, did the trial court fail to provide defendant with
sufficient time to allow defendant to controvert alleged
inaccuracies in the report?

An appellate court will not consider

issues raised for the first time on appeal.
660 P.2d 252 (Utah 1983).

State v. Steqqell,

"For questions of fact [involved in

sentencing decisions], frequently constituting threshold

inquiries that must be satisfied prior to addressing the legal
intricacies, a 'clearly erroneous' standard applies."

State v.

Rhodes. 818 P.2d 1048, 1049-50 (Utah App. 1991).
2.

Did defendant fail to provide an adequate record

for review by this Court?

It is a well established rule of

appellate procedure that the party asserting error has the "duty
and responsibility of supporting such allegation by an adequate
record."

State v. Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d 289, 294 (Utah 1982),

cert, denied, 460 U.S. 1044 (1983).

An appellate court will

presume regularity in the proceedings below where no transcript
of the sentencing hearing was provided the appellate court and
there was no suggestion that a presentence report was effectively
concealed from the defendant.

State v. Mitchell, 671 P.2d 213,

215 (Utah 1983).
3.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in

sentencing defendant to consecutive terms of imprisonment and a
$ 5,000 fine?

"[B]efore the reviewing court may overturn the

sentence given by the trial court[,] 'it must be clear that the
actions of the judge were so inherently
an abuse of discretion.'"

unfair

as to constitute

State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1051

(Utah App. 1991) (citing State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887
(Utah 1978) (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).
4.

Did the trial court improperly refuse to order

defendant undergo a 90-day diagnostic evaluation ? An appellate
court will not disturb a sentence or a denial of an diagnostic
evaluation unless it constitutes an abuse of discretion.
2

State

v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah 1989); State v, Russell,
772 P.2d 971, 971 (Utah 1989) •
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Determinative constitutional provisions, statutes and
rules are compiled in Appendix A where not set forth in the body
of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information with forgery, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501
(1992) (R. 3). In exchange for a reduced charge, defendant pled
guilty to forgery, a third degree felony (R. 8-15).

Thereafter,

the court sentenced defendant to a term of not more than five
years in the Utah State Prison, to be served consecutively with
another conviction in Washington County, upon which defendant had
been sentenced six days earlier.

The court also ordered

defendant to pay a fine of $5,000.00 and to pay restitution in
the amount of $750.00 (R. 51-53; T. 19). Defendant appeals from
that order.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Prior to his sentencing, defendant sought the
production of various documents which would inform him of the
existence of fugitive warrants appearing on his record and which
he had learned would affect the recommendations of the Department
of Corrections concerning his sentencing (see Defendant's

3

Petition for Records, Document and Things, R. 37-38).x

The

record is silent as to whether defendant received any documents
in response to his motions.

However, defendant was sentenced on

a separate felony in the Washington County District Court on
April 8, 1992, six days before his sentencing in this matter,
during which the same presentence report, less an addendum, was
used (T. 2-3).2
At the beginning of the sentencing hearing defense
counsel informed the trial court as follows:
Bear in mind that Mr. Wicks has informed me
that he didn't get an opportunity to review
this report in Washington County. That here
in Iron County was really the first time that
he's had a chance to go through the report.
And I should point out that he really didn't
have a chance to really read the report, but
I pointed out the — what I considered to be
the key factors in the report as to why the
evaluation came out the way it did, which was
his extensive record that is set out in
there."
(T. 2-3) (emphasis added).

He claimed that the report

1

Defendant also filed an affidavit stating that his lawyer,
who is also representing defendant on appeal, was not assisting
him in obtaining the necessary documents, and a motion requesting
that he be allowed to proceed pro se (see Affidavit, dated March
31, 1992 (R. 39) and Motion for Self Representation, filed March
27, 1992 (R. 34). Notwithstanding defendant's complaints of his
counsel's performance prior to the sentencing hearing, no claim
of ineffective assistance had been made, and although defendant's
motion for self representation does not appear to have been
explicitly ruled on, it is apparent that defendant abandoned any
claim he might have had when, at the sentencing, he did not
respond to the opening remarks concerning pending motions (T. 2),
and when he did not object to Mr. Jackson's represention on
appeal (T. 14).
2

A complete copy of the sentencing hearing is attached at
Addendum B.
4

inaccurately referenced numerous fugitive warrants and
convictions (T. 4-8). Howeverf the trial court noted that,
notwithstanding these alleged inaccuracies, there were sufficient
accurately reflected convictions to support the recommendations
made in the presentence report, and, in view of defendant's
having lied to the court before, the court would sentence in
accordance with the recommendations (T. 17-19).

The court also

refused to order a 90-day diagnostic evaluation for defendant (T.
15-16).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant waived his claim that the trial court did not
allow Him sufficient time in which to rebut alleged inaccuracies
in the presentence report.

At the sentencing hearing defendant

remarked only that he had not had much opportunity to review the
report*

He neither indicated that the opportunity was

insufficient nor did he request a continuance. In any event,
because defendant received a similar report six days earlier, he
had sufficient opportunity to challenge the report, of which he
took full advantage.
Defendant has not provided this Court with a copy of
the presentence report, and so it should presume regularity in
the proceedings below and decline to consider defendant's claims.
However# even without the report, the transcript of the
sentencing hearing shows that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in sentencing defendant to consecutive prison terms
and ordering him to pay a $ 5,000 fine.

5

Defendant admitted that

the "poor" rating he received on the matrix might still not
change even if the alleged inaccuracies were discounted.
Further, the sentence, based on defendant's having received a
"poor" rating, was in accord with the Utah Sentence and Release
Guidelines.
The trial court properly refused to order defendant
undergo a 90-day diagnostic evaluation.

First, defendant's claim

on appeal, that he requested the diagnostic evaluation for the
purpose of further challenging the inaccuracies in the
presentence report, was not made to the trial court.

Therefore,

the claim has not been preserved for appeal and this Court should
decline to review it.

Second, the transcript of the sentencing

hearing indicates that the trial court had sufficient information
on which to base its refusal to order defendant undergo a 90-day
diagnostic evaluation.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT DID NOT RAISE AN OBJECTION IN THE
TRIAL COURT THAT HE HAD INSUFFICIENT TIME TO
REBUT EVIDENCE COLLECTED IN THE PRESENTENCE
REPORT, THEREBY WAIVING THE CLAIM ON APPEAL.
IN ANY EVENT, THE TRIAL COURT'S DISCLOSURE OF
THE PRESENTENCE REPORT TO DEFENDANT, PLUS
DEFENDANT'S OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW A
COMPARABLE PRESENTENCE REPORT SIX DAYS PRIOR
TO HIS SENTENCING, ACCORDED DEFENDANT DUE
PROCESS.
A.

Defendant Waived his Claim
on Appeal.
"As a general rule, a timely and specific objection

must be made in order to preserve an issue for appeal.

6

Absent a

timely objection, [an appellate court] will review an alleged
error only if it is obvious and harmful, i.e., only if it
constitutes "plain error."

State v. Whittle, 780 P.2d 819, 820-

21 (Utah 1989) (citations omitted).
At the sentencing hearing defendant informed the trial
court, through counsel, that he had reviewed the presentence
report, but that he had not really read it (T. 2-3). However, he
in no way indicated to the court that he had not had sufficient
time to consider the report, nor did he claim that he had not had
"sufficient time to properly challenge the inaccuracies contained
in the presentence investigation report," as he now claims for
the first time on appeal (Point I of Appellant's Brief at 8).
Further, at no time did defendant move the court for a
continuance in order to challenge the report's alleged
inaccuracies.

On appeal, defendant has not claimed the trial

court's handling of the presentence report was plain error.
Therefore, this Court should decline to review the merits of
defendant's claim.
The State's resort to waiver in this matter is further
strengthened in the context of defendant's challenge by State v.
Sanwick, 713 P.2d 707 (Utah 1986) (per curiam).

In Sanwick, the

defendant was denied the opportunity to cross-examine his
daughters, victims of the offense to which he had pled guilty and
whose statements were the basis of damaging testimony of others
whose statements were included in the presentence report. JEci. at
708-09.

In holding the defendant was not denied due process,
7

notwithstanding his right to information that would bear on his
sentencing, the Utah Supreme Court cited with approval State v.
Tranqsrud, 651 P.2d 37 (Mont. 1982), wherein the Supreme Court of
Montana also held that there was no denial of due process where a
defendant took the stand to rebut the accuracy of the presentence
report.

Id. at 40. Though not specifically referenced by

Sanwick, the supreme court in Tranqsrud also found that the
defendant had waived for appeal the claim that he had
insufficient time to acquire witnesses to rebut information
contained in the presentence report where he had failed to
request a continuance from the court.
B.

Ibid.

Defendant Had Sufficient
Access to the Presentence Report.
Fundamental fairness requires that the trial court

disclose to a criminal defendant his presentence report prior to
sentencing in order to better insure that the trial court's
sentencing discretion is based on accurate information.

State v.

Lipskv, 608 P.2d 1241, 1248 (Utah 1980); accord. State v.
Casarez, 656 P.2d 1005, 1007 (Utah 1982); State v. Howell, 707
P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985).
"If the defendant thinks the report inaccurate, he
should then have the opportunity to bring such inaccuracies to
the court's attention."
P.2d at 1008.

Lipskv, 608 P.2d at 1244; Casarez, 656

See also Sanwick, 713 P.2d at 709 (noting the

admissibility of hearsay in the presentence report "as long as
the defendant had the opportunity to rebut the adverse evidence
and to challenge the reliability of the evidence presented").
8

Defendant does not claim, like the defendant in
Lipskv, that the trial court denied him due process by denying
him access to the presentence report, but rather that the court
failed to provide him with sufficient time to rebut certain
alleged inaccuracies in the report (Point I of Appellant's Brief
at 7-8). Defendant relies on State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048,
1050-51 (Utah App. 1991) (finding the defendant's access to the
presentence report and the diagnostic evaluation for almost two
weeks prior to defendant's second hearing afforded him sufficient
opportunity to effectively contest the alleged factual
inaccuracies).

In so arguing, defendant misconstrues the breadth

of rebuttal, and consequently the right of confrontation, allowed
a defendant in a sentencing hearing by Lipskv and its progeny.
In expanding the defendant's due process rights in
Lipskv, the Utah Supreme Court simultaneously restricted the
extent to which the bases of the trial court's sentencing
decision could be exposed by a defendant.

Thus, the court held

that the defendant had a right of access to the presentence
report prior to sentencing, for the purpose of challenging
alleged inaccuracies, but at the same time the trial court could
receive a presentence report without having to allow its author
to personally appear and testify in open court to defend the
report.

Id.

at 1244.

One year later, in State v. Hanson, 627 P.2d 53 (Utah
1981), the court rejected a defendant's claim that he had been
denied due process because he was not allowed to appear at a
9

staff meeting of the Department of Adult Probation and Parole
where recommendations for the presentence report were developed.
In rejecting the defendant's challenge, the court again referred
to the trial court's prerogatives in receiving a presentence
report without having to require its authors to appear, stating
that the right to disclosure was not accompanied by the right of
confrontation.

j[d. at 55.

Finally, in Sanwick, the court cited with approval
Tranqsrud, wherein the Montana high court held there was no
denial of due process where a defendant was restricted to simply
taking the stand to rebut claimed inaccuracies in the presentence
report.

Sanwick, 651 P.2d at 40. Viewed from this perspective,

this Court's holding in Rhodes does not require a certain minimum
period of time which a defendant must be allowed in order to
properly challenge alleged inaccuracies in a presentence report,
but instead merely indicates that having two weeks notice of the
contents of a presentence report was quite sufficient for the
defendant in that case to muster his challenge.
Even if this Court were to find in Rhodes, a
requirement of a certain minimal time which should be afforded a
defendant to challenge claimed inaccuracies in a presentence
report, a requirement nowhere to be found Lipskv and its progeny,
or supported by any authority cited by defendant, the facts of
this case would still support the adequacy of disclosure in this
case.
First, defendant was given the presentence report (T.
10

2).

Second, defendant admitted that he had been sentenced on the

basis of the same presentence report presented in a sentencing in
Washington County, less an addendum prepared for the Iron County
District Court in the present case (T. 2). The date of the
sentencing in Washingtbn County does not formally appear in the
record, however, defendant acknowledged in a letter to a clerk in
the Iron County District Court that he was being sentenced in
Washington County on April 8, 1992 (R. 45). It is also apparent
from the record that the presentence report used to sentence
defendant in Washington County must have been substantially
similar to the one used in this case because defendant's counsel,
in addition to essentially admitting that the reports were the
same (T. 2), informed the trial court that defendant was moving
the Washington County court to reconsider the judgment for
reasons similar to those which he would raise in this case (T.
3).

Thus, it would appear from the record that defendant had

access to the presentence report almost one week prior to his
sentencing in this case, notwithstanding his assertions that he
had not had the opportunity to review the Washington County
presentence report (T. 3). See Mitchell, 671 P.2d at 215
(holding the defendant's request for a remand for resentencing
frivolous where there was no suggestion that the presentence
report was presented in such a way as to conceal it or deter the
defendant from inspecting it).
Finally, defendant was freely permitted to challenge
the alleged inaccuracies in the presentence report.

11

He testified

at length that he was unaware of twenty-four arrest warrants
listed in the report, and he denied the accuracy of nineteen
misdemeanors (T. 7-8). He specifically denied listed convictions
in Cleveland, Ohio, Horsham and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and
Los Alamitos, California (T. 4-7). He also specifically
challenged the listing of fugitive warrants in Wyoming and
Cuyohoga County, Ohio, claiming that he knew nothing about them
(T. 3-4). In response, the court asserted that it was not
relying on these disputed arrest and misdemeanor convictions, but
rather on the remaining unchallenged record set forth in the
presentence report (T. 19-20).
On such facts defendant cannot reasonably maintain that
he was denied disclosure of the contents of the presentence
report, or a sufficient opportunity to rebut the accuracy of the
report.
POINT II
REGULARITY IN THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW SHOULD BE
PRESUMED WHERE DEFENDANT FAILED TO INCLUDE IN
THE RECORD ON APPEAL THE PRESENTENCE REPORT.
HOWEVER, RELYING ONLY ON THE RECORD OF THE
SENTENCING HEARING, THE RECORD INDICATES THE
TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
SENTENCING DEFENDANT ON THE UNCHALLENGED
INFORMATION IN THE PRESENTENCE REPORT.
,f

[B]efore the reviewing court may overturn the sentence

given by the trial court[,] 'it must be clear that the actions of
the judge were so inherently
discretion.'M

unfair

as to constitute an abuse of

State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1051 (Utah App.

1991) (citing State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978)
(emphasis added) (citation omitted)).
12

"The burden of showing error is on the party who seeks
to upset the judgment."

State v. Noren, 704 P.2d 568, 571 (Utah

1985) (quoting State v. Jones, 657 P.2d 1263, 1267 (Utah 1982)).
In this case defendant has failed to include in the
record on appeal the presentence report containing the alleged
inaccuracies of which he complains and which undoubtedly formed
the basis of the trial court's sentencing decision.

On such

failure this court may decline to review the merits of
defendant's claim, presuming regularity in the proceedings below.
See State v. Eloae, 762 P.2d 1, 2 (Utah 1988) (per curiam)
(presuming regularity in the proceedings below where the
defendant, challenging the trial court's discretion in denying
him a 90-day diagnostic evaluation and sentencing him to a
potential life sentence, failed to provide the court with a copy
of the presentence report from which it might have assessed the
trial court's discretion); Mitchell, 671 P.2d at 215 (presuming
regularity in the proceedings below where, though no transcript
of the sentencing hearing was provided the appellate court, there
was no suggestion that a presentence report was effectively
concealed from the defendant); but see Lipsky, 608 P.2d at 1246
n.9 rciting State v. Carson, 597 P.2d 862, 866 (Utah 1979), for
the proposition that, in order "[t]o avoid errors, sentencing
procedures require a somewhat stricter standard than the general
presumption of regularity").
Even if this Court were to take the more rigorous
stance, refusing to presume the regularity of the proceedings

13

below in absence of the presentence report, the proceedings at
the sentencing hearing amply show the trial court did not abuse
its discretion.3
After having challenged in detail the accuracy of the
presentence report's list of his prior crimes, defendant admitted
to three prior felony convictions and numerous prior
confrontations with the authorities, albeit encounters in which

3

While no Utah case has expressly held that following a
defendant's identification of inaccurate information in the
presentence report the court may then proceed to sentence him in
reliance on the accurate, unchallenged information in the report,
the proposition is implicit in Lipskv and its progeny, and
express in the caselaw of other jurisdictions. See Lipskv, 608
P.2d at 1249 ("The fair administration of justice at the least
requires that the information upon which the judge relies in
imposing punishment is accurate."); Rhodes, 818 P.2d at 1050
("The Lipskv court emphasized that the decision to compel
disclosure of presentence reports was not intended to impinge
upon the sentencing judge's discretion to determine what
punishment fits both the crime and the offender. Rather, the
court was interested in shoring up the soundness and reliability
of the factual basis upon which the judge relies in the exercise
of that sentencing discretion."); State v. Binqman, 745 P.2d 342,
349 (Mont. 1987) (finding that even without the questionable
presentence report incidents, there was substantial support for
the challenged criminal offender designation found by the court);
Thurlkill v. State. 551 P.2d 541, 545 (Alaska 1976) (holding that
whenever a presentence report contains improper reference to
"police contacts," the trial court shall indicate on the record
that it has not relied on such information in imposing sentence).
Indeed, in State v. Roberts, 612 P.2d 360, 361 (Utah 1980),
a post-Lipskv case, the Utah Supreme Court found a failure to
disclose a presentence report was not prejudicial. The defendant
did not claim that there were inaccuracies in the report, but
merely that the failure to furnish him with a copy prior to
sentencing was a denial of his rights to counsel and
confrontation of witnesses. The court upheld the sentence,
noting that the trial court had stated the information in the
report that it relied on and gave the defendant to refute the
matter. The court found no prejudice where the record did not
indicate that the defendant would have received probation if he
had received a copy of the report prior to sentencing.
14

charges had either been dropped or not even filed (T. 8). He
specifically

admitted to a charge in Duval, Florida for forgery,

which had been dismissed/

Following the prosecution's

presentation, defense counsel acknowledged that defendant had
lied to the court on previous occasions (T. 16-19)•

In

sentencing defendant, the trial court explicitly noted that the
recommendations of the Adult Probation and Parole investigators
were justified even after discounting the challenged felonies (T.
19-20).
Most significantly, defendant admitted that even
discounting the challenged convictions, it was not clear that his
classification on the matrix would change (T. 9). Defendant was
assigned a "poor" rating in the presentence report (T. 8). The
"General Disposition Matrix - Felonies" for determining fines and
bails suggests a fine of $ 5,000 for a third degree felon
assigned a "poor" rating.

See Appx. C, Code of Jud. Admin.

(1992) (attached at Addendum A).

The Utah Sentence and Release

Guidelines provide that the court may sentence a defendant to
serve consecutive prison terms if the defendant is a fugitive.
See Form 4, Appx., Code of Jud. Admin. (1992) (attached at
Addendum A).

While defendant denied knowledge of 24 listed

arrest warrants in the report, he did not refute their existence.
However, he did acknowledge the existence of at least one
4

See Howell, 707 P.2d at 118 (noting that in sentencing the
trial court may also consider facts relating to dismissed charges
in related crimes); State v. Lipskv, 639 P.2d 174, 176 (Utah
1981) ("Lipskv II") (noting the propriety of the trial court's
considering an acquittal in sentencing).
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fugitive warrant, issued out of Colorado Springs, on which he had
not yet been arraigned (T. 7). Therefore, if discounting the
challenged inaccuracies in the report might still not have
changed defendant's classification, as defendant admits, then it
cannot have been an abuse of discretion for the trial court to
have sentenced him to consecutive prison terms and a $ 5,000
fine, a result in accord with the Code of Judicial
Administration.

Further, since the trial court had sufficient,

accurate information on which to sentence defendant as it did,
there was again no abuse of discretion in the sentencing.
POINT III
DEFENDANT FAILED TO PRESERVE FOR APPEAL THE
ARGUMENT THAT HE REQUESTED A 90-DAY
DIAGNOSTIC EVALUATION TO FURTHER DISPUTE THE
INACCURACY OF THE PRESENTENCE REPORT.
FURTHER, THE RECORD SUPPLIED ON APPEAL SHOWS
THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD SUFFICIENT
INFORMATION IN THE PRESENTENCE REPORT UPON
WHICH TO BASE THE SENTENCE, THUS PROPERLY
DENYING DEFENDANT'S REQUEST.
On appeal defendant claims that the trial court erred
in refusing to order a 90-day diagnostic evaluation because: (1)
the court deprived him of the means to challenge the accuracy of
the presentence report and (2) the court restricted its
consideration of legally relevant factors bearing on his
sentencing (Point IV of Appellant's Brief at 10-11).
A.

Failure to Preserve Issue for Appeal.
This Court should simply decline to consider

defendant's first argument because at the sentencing hearing his
request for the 90-day diagnostic evaluation was based
16

exclusively on his belief that he was in need of psychological
treatment (T. 11-16).

See State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1144-

45 (Utah 1989) (noting general rule that the grounds for the
objection must be distinctly and specifically stated in the trial
court before an appellate court will review those grounds on
appeal).
B.

90-Day Diagnostic evaluation is Not Necessary
if Trial Court has Enough Information.
An appellate court will "set aside a sentence imposed

by the trial court . . . if the trial judge fails to consider all
legally relevant factors, or if the sentence imposed exceeds the
limits prescribed by law,"

State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 1135

(Utah 1989) (citations omitted), or "if it can be said that no
reasonable man would take the view adopted by the court."

State

v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978).
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-404(1)(a)(i) (Supp. 1992)
provides;
In felony cases where the court is of
the opinion imprisonment may be appropriate
but desires more detailed information as a
basis for determining the sentence to be
imposed than has been provided by the
presentence report, the court may in its
discretion commit a convicted defendant to
the custody of the Department of Corrections
for a diagnostic evaluation for a period not
exceeding 90 days. [Emphasis added.]
Ordering "an evaluation before passing sentence is
clearly within [the judge's] discretion, based on his own
judgment of the case before him."

Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887.

However, the law does not compel a trial court to order a 90-day
17

diagnostic evaluation merely "because it would have given the
judge more information on which to base the sentence."

State v.

Brown, 771 P.2d 1067, 1067-68 (Utah 1989).
The proper inquiry is whether the court is
"sufficiently apprised of the pertinent background facts
concerning the defendant,"

Jd. at 1068 (finding that where the

trial court had sufficient background information refusal to
order a 90-day diagnostic evaluation was not an abuse of
discretion); see also State v. Russell, 772 P.2d 971 (Utah 1989)
(90-day diagnostic evaluation was not necessary because judge had
sufficient information).
The record of the sentencing hearing indicates that
defendant clearly articulated his reasons for requesting a 90-day
diagnostic evaluation and, in so doing, informed the trial court
of his drug problem (T. 11-16, 18-19).

The record also indicates

that the trial court had sufficient information on which to
sentence defendant (T. 8-19).

Furthermore, defendant can only

reasonably support his claim that the trial court abused its
discretion in refusing to order a 90-day diagnostic evaluation by
presenting this Court with the presentence report.

Defendant has

neither supplied the necessary record on appeal nor successfully
refuted the report's designation of him as a "poor" candidate,
which designation justifies the trial court, in its discretion,
to sentence a defendant to prison rather than a treatment
alternative.

See Form 3, Appx. E, Code of Jud. Admin, (attached

at Addendum A).

See also Eloqe, 762 P.2d at 2 (per curiam)
18

(presuming regularity in the proceedings below where the
defendant, challenging the trial court's discretion in denying
him a 90-day diagnostic evaluation and sentencing him to a
potential life sentence, failed to provide the court with a copy
of the presentence report from which it might have assessed the
trial court's exercise of discretion).

Therefore, this Court

should presume regularity in the proceedings below and find that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to order
defendant undergo a 90-day diagnostic evaluation•
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing reasons, the State
respectfully requests that this Court affirm defendant's
sentence•
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

5

day of October, 1992.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

KENNETH A. BRONSTON
Assistant Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to
J. Bryan Jackson, Attorney for Defendant, 111 North Main, Post
Office Box 519, Cedar City, Utah 84720, this : £
1992.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1992)

76-3-404. Presentence investigation and diagnostic evaluation — Commitment of defendant — Sentencing
procedure.
(1) (a) (i) In felony cases where the court is of the opinion imprisonment
may be appropriate but desires more detailed information as a basis
for determining the sentence to be imposed than has been provided
by the presentence report, the court may in its discretion commit a
convicted defendant to the custody of the Department of Corrections
for a diagnostic evaluation for a period not exceeding 90 days.
(ii) The Department of Corrections shall conduct a complete study
and evaluation of the defendant during that time, inquiring into
matters including:
(A) the defendant's previous delinquency or criminal experience;
(B) his social background;
(C) his capabilities;
(D) his mental, emotional, and physical health; and
(E) the rehabilitative resources or programs which may be
available to suit his needs.
(b) (i) By the expiration of the commitment period, or by the expiration
of additional commitment time the court may grant, not exceeding a
further period of 90 days, the defendant shall be returned to the court
for sentencing and the court,, prosecutor, and the defendant or his
attorney shall be provided with a written diagnostic evaluation report of results of the study, including any recommendations the Department of Corrections or the Utah State Hospital believes will be
helpful to a proper resolution of the case.
(ii) Any diagnostic evaluation report ordered by the court is supplemental to and becomes a part of the presentence investigation
report.
(iii) After receiving the diagnostic evaluation report and recommendations, the court shall proceed to sentence a defendant in accordance with the sentencing alternatives provided under Section
76-3-201.
(2) Any commitment for presentence investigation under this section does
not constitute a commitment to prison. However, any person who is committed to prison following proceedings under this section shall be given credit
against his sentence for the time spent in confinement for a presentence investigation report.
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CEDAR CITY, UTAH; TUESDAY, APRIL 14# 1992

2

-oOo-

3
4

THE COURT: The Court calls State versus David Bryant

5

Wicks.

6

pending motions, I guess, since the last hearing with the

7

Court.

8

prosecution with copies of pro se correspondence as —

9

has been received.

10 I

This matter is on for sentencing.

There's some

I've provided both defense counsel and the

MR. JACKSON:

as it

I'm not sure where we're at on all of

11

that, Your Honor, in terms of his earlier request, but we

12

are prepared to go ahead with sentencing.

13

THE COURT: All right.

Go ahead and —

14

presentence report prepared.

15

And you have that?

16

MR. JACKSON:

Yeah.

there's been a

I've had an opportunity to go

17

through this with Mr. Wicks. Basically, as I'm

18

understanding what we have is actually a presentence report

19

that was prepared through the Washington County court, in

20

which he's been sentenced on.

21

THE COURT: And then an addendum for this court.

22

MR. JACKSON:

23

Okay.

And then an addendum for this court.
He was sentenced in Washington County —

24

was sentenced in Washington County to serve on a

25

third-degree felony, zero to five, and I guess the —

PAULG.MCMULLIN
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

the

he

1

real question that we have in this case, really, is whether

2

or not this case should run consecutively or concurrently

3

with that order of commitment.

4

The —

what Mr. Wicks has requested that I ask the

5

Court do is to consider —

6

commitment, an order to have him go up and serve a

7

diagnostic —

8

that he is going to be entitled to this partly because he

9

has made a motion in Washington County to have the Court

consider rather than the

have a diagnostic evaluation done.

He feels

10

reconsider judgment down there. And the reasons are

11

similar, and I'll go through those.

12

Bear in mind that Mr. Wicks has informed me that

13

he didn't get an opportunity to review this report in

14

Washington County.

15

first time that he's had a chance to go through the report.

16

And I should point out that he really didn't have a chance

17

to really read the report, but I pointed out the —

18

considered to be the key factors in the report as to why the

19

evaluation came out the way it did, which was his extensive

20

record that is set out in there.

21

That here in Iron County was really the

And in the record, Mr. Wicks —

what I

basically I'll go

22

ahead and give this to the Court.

But he's made a notation

23

by the offenses that he doesn't feel apply to him.

24

of those is the first offense listed July 19, 1991.

25

bad check.

It's a Casper, Wyoming, matter.

PAULG.MCMULLIN
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And one
It's a

1

Do you want to go ahead and tell the Court —

2

MR. WICKS: Yes.

3

THE COURT:

Go ahead.

4

MR. WICKS;

Your Honor, I don't have an arrest warrant

5

from Casper, Wyoming, as far as I know.

6

been served with one.

7
8
9
10

In the presentence report, it also has that I have
a warrant in the state of Ohio.
MR. JACKSON:

Yeah.

Cleveland, Ohio, on 8-9-91.

There's an arrest warrant listed there, plus also Cuyahoga.

11

MR. WICKS:

12

MR. JACKSON:

Cuyahoga County.

15
16

A conviction.

Cuyahoga County.

13 I a conviction in Cleveland, Ohio.
14

At least I have not

A conviction —

there's

There's a warrant issued

in Cuyahoga, Ohio, 8-20-91.
You're saying that one doesn't apply to you?
MR. WICKS: No, Your Honor.

Because Ohio —

the state

17

of Ohio is the one that released me to the state of Utah for

18

extradition.

19

have a warrant for me when they gave me to this state?

20

haven't been released since Ohio released me to this state.

I was not convicted there; so, how can they

21

THE COURT: Okay.

22 I

MR. JACKSON:

23
24
25

Okay. And then we have one in Oklahoma

that you've made a notation of for cocaine.
MR. WICKS:

I

Yes.

I was stopped by a police officer

there, and I was brought in for possession of cocaine.

PAULG.MCMULLIN
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1

There was residue in a bowl. But I wasn't the driver of the

2

car, and it wasn't my car.

3

convicted as it says on here for 353 days.

4
5

MR. JACKSON:

I was released.

I was never

It does indicate that he was sentenced for

353 days.

6 I

MR. WICKS:

I wasn't.

I was released, because I wasn't

7

the driver of the car, nor was I the owner of the car. And

8

it wasn't found on my person; so, they dismissed it.

9

THE COURT: Were you in jail 353 days —

10

MR. WICKS: No, sir.

11

THE COURT:

—

12

MR. WICKS:

No, sir.

waiting for trial or anything?
I was released two days after I

13

was in jail, and the public defender says —

14

about a standing that I — I didn't —

15

the car, and I wasn't the driver, and he —

16

released, and I never got sentenced to 300 and some days on

17

anything like that.

18

MR. JACKSON:

19

a —

20

warrant.

21
22

said something

I was not the owner of
they —

I was

Then he's noted Maywood, Illinois, there's

there's something.

It makes reference to a Florida

Extradited to Florida.
Were you picked up in Illinois on —

MR. WICKS: No.

Your Honor, I never was extradited to

23

the state of Florida.

24

mentions in there about Duval County Court, that's in

25

Jacksonville.

Yes.

I have —

I was in Duval —

when it

I was there, and I was charged with

PAUL G. MCMULLIN
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1

forgery, and it was dismissed.

But I was never —

2

Maywood, Illinois —

I've never heard of them.

3

MR. JACKSON:

4

MR. WICKS:

And Middleton, Pennsylvania?

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, is where I had

5

my first conviction.

6

MR. JACKSON:

7

Illinois.

There is a Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,

conviction listed on here, but —

8 I

MR. WICKS: Maywood, no; Middleton, no.

9

MR. JACKSON:

10
11

Okay.

There's also a second Philadelphia

conviction.
MR. WICKS:

Yeah.

Your Honor, a lot of them, they are

12

repeating, like the same —

13

the same thing as the ones on the other page.

14

repeating them.

15
16

MR. JACKSON:

you look at that one.

They're just

and this one is 11-2, 1989.
MR. WICKS: Okay.

18

MR. JACKSON:

19

MR. WICKS:

Yeah —

yeah.

That's correct.

So there's two of them?

Yes. But I was sentenced together on them.

20

They ran them together. And Horsham —

21

Pennsylvania

23

That's

Well, this one was listed as 11-6, 1988,

17

22 I

this

this one in Horsham,

—

MR. JACKSON:

These two —

you're saying these two

Pennsylvania ones were sentenced together?

24

MR. WICKS:

25

MR. JACKSON:

Yes, sir.
Okay.

What about Horsham, Pennsylvania?

PAULG.MCMULLIN
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1

MR. WICKS: No. That's not me.

2 I

MR. JACKSON:

3

MR. WICKS: No, sir. That's not me.

4

MR. JACKSON:

5

MR. WICKS: And I'm —

All right.

Los Alamitos, California.

All right.

6

I've been locked up.

7

ran the NCIC there.

I haven't seen anything since

I was in Cuyahoga County Jail. They
I was locked up in the jail in

8 I St. George, and I had a negative NCIC there, and now all of
9

a sudden I'm told that I'm the 10 most wanted person.

10

haven't seen anything -- I have no —

11

warrant.

12

that I'm the 10 most wanted person in the world.

13
14
15
16

I

I have one fugative

I haven't seen anything else that would indicate

MR. JACKSON:

He's -- he's got —

received a fugative

warrant from Colorado Springs.
Is that correct?
MR. WICKS: Right. And I haven't been —

the county

17

attorney's office hasn't served me with a fugitive warrant

18

on it, and I haven't been arraigned on it yet.

19

presentence report says that there's 24 outstanding fugitive

20

warrants pending, and they used their matrix to evaluate me

21

and to stop me from going to the ninety day program, but I

22

haven't seen 24 warrants.

23

MR. JACKSON:

But the

He's basically saying that he wants to

24

address whatever is out there, but presently, there's

25

he's not aware of what these 24 states have on him, because

PAULG.MCMULLIN
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—

8
1
2

he's never been —
THE COURT:

3
4
5

he's never received a warrant,

Okay. What's his

~

Mr. Wicks, what is your —

how many felonies do

you claim that you have been convicted of?
MR. WICKS:

I have three prior felony convictions and —

6

numerous amounts of confrontations with the law where they

7

either dropped charges or no charges were brought.

8

cashed bad checks. And Cleveland, Ohio, is one of them.

9

But they didn't convict me. They dismissed the charges

10

pending extradition to the state of Utah.

11

there is Judge Willman.

12

8560?

13

any crime.

I have

And the judge

And they can call 443 ~

is it

And they can confirm that they did not convict me of

14

I have —

15

Honor, I#d like to see them.

16

reason why I'm not being permitted to be evaluated on the

17

ninety day is because of —

18

my matrix score up, but I have not seen what they're

19

allegating [sic] in this presentence report.

20 I

MR. JACKSON:

if I have 24 fugitive warrants, Your
But as far as I know, the

all these warrants has brought

And on the matrix score, Your Honor,

21

basically what we have here is their score comes up to 17,

22

which categorizes him as a poor candidate.

23

score of 15 or less —

24

off —

25

it looks like from the report, that there is 19 prior

If he had a

if there were two points deducted

and I donft know if we get there or not.
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1

misdemeanors, according to the schedule. And so they've

2

given him the worst classification.

3

have that readjusted, he has to —

4

more than seven.

5

But in order for him to

he can't have really any

And so we've knocked out —

well, let's just —

6

for argument's sake, let's just say that Mr. Wicks is right,

7

and so this Casper, Wyoming, one goes —

8

four, five, six, seven, eight —

9

it that way.

let's —

one, two, three,
yeah.

Let's try

Let's count it one, two, three, four, five,

10

six, seven, eight —

there's eight that the disposition is

11

listed as being a conviction.

12

disposition is unknown.

13

that he's taking issue with.

14

the —

15

place that I think it might is in the category involving

16

supervision history.

17

with the worst category, which is basically that he

18

committed this violation while he was under current

19

supervision.

20

report, which if that were reclassified down to a —

21

the other categories below three, then of course he would be

22

right on the borderline as being a fair candidate, which

23

would put him into the category of considering an

24

alternative to prison of —

25

evaluation might —

There's a couple here where

That's eight, not counting the ones
So I don't know if it changes

it may not change the classification, but the one

They have really —

they've listed him

And that doesn't seem to bear that out in the
one of

and to where a 90-day diagnostic

might come into play.
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1

MR. WICKS:

I'm not on probation; I'm not on parole.

2

I'm not on anything from the court.

3

what they have that I'm wanted someplace because of release

4

and supervision.

5

category.

6

So that is not true

That would have put me in the ninety day

The last time when I was here before you, and I

7

asked that motion about —

to dismiss, because I said that I

8

was in Ohio for all that —

for these seven months, and that

9

I didn't get a opportunity to have due process by an

10

attorney and all that stuff, you said because I didn't have

11

a memorandum or any type of case law ~

12

was saying, that you dismissed it.

13

There's no proof that I am the one ~

14

there's no proof of 19 misdemeanors, and there's no proof of

15

any of supervised release that I'm wanted, and I'm on

16

probation and parole. And I think if you was to use that

17

against me without any proof, it would be unfair.

18

MR. JACKSON:

any proof to what I

Well, here, Your Honor.
10 most wanted, and

We would take issue with the fact that

19

there's —

the report makes mention of this, that he's on

20

the 10 most wanted list. We don't know that.

21

seen anything that reflects that.

22

consideration in the —

23

summary is put together —

24

together, it does list that as a factor that was considered

25

in coming in with this.

I haven't

It does come into

in the actual evaluation.

Where the

evaluative summary is put
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1 I

It's also listed that he's made false statements

2

and filed numerous grievances and stuff. And —

3

he has tried to effectuate his rights in this case, I don't

4

think he's done it with the intent to try to hassle anybody

5

or whatever.

6

that —

He certainly objects to the classification

that he's filed false statements.

7
8

and while

And I guess in a nutshell, what we're requesting
is two things.

9 I as —

Number one, that the Court consider rather

rather than just committing him, that the Court

10

consider a 90-day evaluation to «-- for further

11

consideration.

12

his —

13

his mental health problem.

14

could —

15

accessing while he were in prison.

16

State to try to —

17

ninety day would be very helpful in diagnosing Mr. Wicks,

18

even if the Court ultimately did convict him —

19

sentence him to —

We believe that it's warranted in —

given

his acknowledged substance abuse problem as well as

20

There might be something that he

even if he is committed, that he could start
And it's worth it to the

to try to reconcile that.

And so the

or did

to prison after the ninety day.

Secondly, we would ask the Court to consider

21

running this matter concurrently with the Washington County

22

matter.

23

because he has cooperated.

24

pursuant to a plea agreement.

25

Granted, he's made an extensive effort to try to assert

And this we would request the Court do, number one,
He came in; he pled guilty
He —

he has cooperated.
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certain rights and whatnot, but in every sense, he's tried
to cooperate in providing information and whatnot.
And additionally, that —
just really related to the same —

that these matters are
it's just a continuation

of his same mental condition when it was all happening,
which he's acknowledged.

And so as a consequence, we would

ask that the Court run that together.
There's also the additional factor for the Court
to consider in terms of restitution.

Where there is a

significant amount of restitution involved, if —

if they

were to run consecutively, the victims would be that much
further down the road before he could start paying on
restitution, whereas if they were run concurrently, it would
allow him to get out and start making restitution sooner to
the victim.
And we'd submit it on that, unless you have
something further you want to add.
MR. WICKS:

Your Honor, I had the opportunity to sit

here and witness a lot of people go before you, and a lot of
them asked you to give them a break.

Well, with my record,

I don't expect you to give me a break.

You're the judge,

and I'm the criminal, and I'm not going to deny that.

I

don't have any excuse for my previous behavior other than
the fact that I'm —

I'm addicted to drugs. And that's the

bottom line.
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1

I've been to prison before.

I was at the Arizona

2

State Penitentiary.

3

18 months of that four years. They gave me $50 to get out

4

of prison, and the first thing —

5

prison, I didn't do any drugs. But as soon as I got out —

6

and they gave me a brand new pair of shoes and pants and

7

$50. What I did with the $50 is went and bought some.

8
9

I was sentenced to four years.

I did

the whole time I was in

The the whole time that I've been on the street,
I've been —

I went to —

the military spent a lot of money

10

on me to train me to be a good paralegal.

11

a cook.

12

but I've still got this problem with drugs.

13

To train me to be

I've been to college and made pretty good money,

I can't go to a drug rehab program, because you've

14

got too many other people out there on the street with the

15

same kind of problem that I have.

16

get into a program is if you were rich —

17

I probably would buy drugs with the money —

18

put you in a program.

19

so —

20

your problems.

21

through it.

22

been writing you so many letters•

23

letters that I wrote to you, that's the reason I was asking

24

for a ninety-day commitment in the mental hospital.

25

think I belong there, they'll keep me there more than what

So the only way you can
and if I was rich,
or a judge can

They've got programs at the prison;

they call you while you're sitting there.
But it's not effective.

I've tried.

I've —

Talk about
I've been

And that's the reason why I have
And if you read the
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1

you can even sentence me on this charge.

2

I am asking you for some help.

I don't want you

3

to just put me in a prison and say, ,fHey, in 18 months, let

4

him back on the street and see who else he's going to

5

victimize.ff

6

I'm going to get it cured is —

7

prison ~

8
9
10

I don't know.

correspondence.

And the only way

I mean if you put me in

That's —

THE COURT: All right.

I have ~

I've read the

And let me just address a few of the

matters that you've raised.

11
12

I want to cure this problem.

First of all, you've indicated in one letter that
Mr. Jackson won't represent anything on appeal.

13

But it's my understanding that your contract

14

you and Mr. Park — with the county is to handle that

15

appeal.

16
17
18

MR. JACKSON:

That's correct, Your Honor.

—

We handle the

first appeal.
THE COURT:

Okay.

And that may be affected since one of

19

the rights you gave up with a guilty plea in general is the

20

right to an appeal. And the guilty plea was entered.

21

Mr. Jackson, if an appeal is appropriate, would represent

22

you on that.

23 I

MR. JACKSON:

24

THE COURT:

25

But

Sure.

Secondly, your request for mental health

treatment I don't quite understand.

I understand the
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1

request for a 90-day diagnostic or however many days it ends

2

up being with the department of corrections.

3

changed it to where it's for an indeterminate amount of

4

time. Anywhere from 45 to 90 days, as I understand it.

5

It's different than —

6

incompetent and sending you to a state mental hospital for a

7

period of time.

8
9

They have now

than the Court finding you mentally

I haven't seen anything from you that would
indicate to me that you're not intelligent; that you don't

10

know where you are, and what's going on.

11

articulate.

12

been nothing that I've read that made me think that —

13

you weren't competent to —

14

You're

And while everything has been pro se, there's

MR. WICKS:

that

to be here in court.

I was in the state hospital twice for drug

15

addiction with a — where they put me in there, and they

16

made me —

17

and they were —

18

That's why they said in the report that I have a severe

19

mental health.

20

stupid or anything, they just —

21

had the money to stay, they could treat me for the

22

addiction.

23

lock —

they locked me in the maximum lock down,

give me —

I'm on Sineguan and Thorazine.

It's not because the hospital thinks I'm
at the hospital, if I had

But I can't be released.

That's the reason why I

24

was asking for the hospital.

Because for me t o say, "Hey

25

Judge, I want t o go t o Horizon," you know, are you kidding?
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1

I can walk right in and walk right out of there.

2

asking someplace where you would know that they can't

3

release me; that I will be under the state, and that I'm not

4

going to be released until somebody that has enough

5

intelligence to realize, wHey, this guy has a problem, and

6

he's well now."

7

THE COURT:

I was

So your request for mental health treatment

8

is a request that rather than prison, you be sent to a

9

facility that has drug addiction —

10

MR. WICKS:

The state hospital.

11

THE COURT:

Okay.

12

MR. JACKSON:

13
14

And that's something that could be

evaluated and assessed on a ninety day.
THE COURT: All right.

I understand that point, then,

15

now, I believe. And on the habeas corpus, I think that

16

would have to be addressed after some resolution or a final

17

determination of appeal rights has been concluded.

18

Having said that, I'm going to now let the State

19

respond.

20

far as sentencing.

21 I

I'll give you both another chance in a minute, as

MR. LATIMER:

As far as the habeas corpus, I can inform

22

the Court that that's been filed in Judge Eves' court.

23

was called on last week's calendar —

24

It hadn't been served on the attorney general's office; so,

25

the Court continued it until service could be made on the

yeah.
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Last Monday.

IT—

1

1

attorney general.

2

So that's in the process.

In response to the PSI, the State concurs strongly

3

in the recommendation for a consecutive prison sentence and

4

is kind of dumbfounded to sit here and listen to Mr. Wicks

5

go on and on about how he disputes everything, when what we

6

have is a person with multiple convictions involving

7

dishonesty, multiple false names, multiple false dates of

8

employment, multiple false Social Security numbers, claims

9

of military record that can't be verified, claims of

10

employment that can't be verified.

He lied as to his

11

criminal record.

12

26.

13

he was only 20. He lied to the bank clerks here; he's lied

14

to this court.

15

released from jail. He claimed an excuse once, and that

16

didn't work.

17

excuse; that didn't work.

18

different excuses.

19

committing the crime.

He said in his letter that he started at

He had convictions for forgery in 1979 and 1980, when

20 I

He's come in and is asking you to be

Came back in the next week and claimed another
He comes back in.

I think three

But he claims he can't remember of

It's the State's position that all the evidence in

21

the PSI is —

is trustworthy.

Just because Mr. Wicks

22

doesn't know about it doesn't mean it doesn't exist.

23

are the warrants; there is the status on the 10 most wanted

24

list.

25

to be a waste of time.

There

We think he's had his chances. A diagnostic is going
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THE COURT: That was a regional 10 most wanted

2

MR. LATIMER:

3

A regional.

I got —

—

I don't remember who

it was that reported it.

4

THE COURT:

S

MR. JACKSON:

6

THE COURT: Okay.

7

MR. LATIMER:

—

wasn't it?

I'm just going off memory.

It says in the report it's a regional.

We just think that he's earned a

8

consecutive prison sentence, and we'd ask the Court to

9

follow that recommendation.

10
11

THE COURT:

Okay. And the reason I'm saying I'm going

off memory is I've given the defendant my copy; so —

12

MR. JACKSON:

13

We concede that the —

14

defendant has served to date is 218 days. We're requesting

15

that he be given credit for the time served, if the Court

16

is —

17

as they did in Washington County.

Just a couple of other items, Your Honor.
that the amount of time that the

is inclined to just go ahead and commit him to prison,

18

At the same time, however, Your Honor, we — we

19

would rebut by simply saying that —

20

Mr. Wicks up on a ninety day, the State —

21

prejudiced by that.

22

further information on which to.make an assessment.

23

And one of the questions I guess that's —

that by sending
the State isn't

If anything, it just gives this court

that's

24

there —

and I guess we have to say to Mr. Latimer, he's

25

right —

he's exactly right on everything.
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1

he's —

2

respond by simply saying but that's what happens when a

3

person has really got a problem.

4

he's deceived.

He's done that.

And we would

Here's the first time where there's really any

5

evidence or any —

anything being confronted where Mr. Wicks

6

is saying, "Yeah.

I've got a problem.

7

that problem.11

8

not, we'd ought to send him up on a ninety day.

9

tell him, and he doesn't jump through the hoops or whatever

10

to get into a program, or he's not willing to do that, then

11

he's going to be back here and sentenced per statute

12

anyway.

13

sending him up there, but there is the opportunity there —

14

however slim it is —

15

something, that he might get some help, and we put an end to

16

all of this criminal behavior, where otherwise when

17

Mr. Wicks serves his 18 months or two years or five years or

18

whatever it is, and he goes on and —

19

corrects that sort of behavior anyway.

20 I
21
22
23
24
25

I want to deal with

And really just to see if he's sincere or
And if they

So I don't see that the State loses anything by

that Mr. Wicks does fall within

and never really

We'll submit it on that, Your Honor.

We do feel

that he ought to get credit on the time served.
THE COURT: All right.
presentence report back.

Could you give me the

I'll have a look at that.

Even if I take out some of these felony
convictions, I still think the matrix —
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1

that that's a good idea, based on the defendant's lack of

2

honesty with the Court in the past —

3

too extensive, and I/m going to follow the agency's

4

recommendation and impose sentence pursuant to the statute.

5

Zero to five years in the Utah State Prison, a $5,000 fine,

6

restitution of $750 and to serve the sentence consecutive to

7

any sentence received out of the Washington County case.

8

I'll give the defendant credit for 218 days served, if

9

that's, in fact, what —

10

MR. LATIMER:

the criminal record is

the number of days.

My understanding —

I'm not sure, but I

11

know this comes up before in Judge Eves' court.

12

opinion that the board of pardons makes that call.

13

THE COURT: All right.

14

MR. LATIMER:

15

THE COURT:

16

And then

if it's within their jurisdiction, they'll have the final
MR. WICKS:

18 I

MR. JACKSON:

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. LATIMER:

21

THE COURT:

23

But I'll include it in the judgment.

Let's include it in the judgment.

17

22

It's his

Is that 218?

Is that what

—

218•

That's what I was told

~

All right.
—

that's what the actual days are.

All right.

That's the order to be prepared by the

county attorney's office.

24

MR. JACKSON:

25

THE COURT:

~

Your Honor, the ~

there is a

Okay.
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1 I

MR. JACKSON:

There is apparently a van or something

2

that's going up pretty quick.

3

soon as possible.

4
5
6
7
8

He'd like to be sent up as

THE COURT; All right. As soon as transportation can be
arranged, it's to occur.
MR. JACKSON:

Thank you.

(Whereupon the proceedings in the above-entitled
matter were concluded.)
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